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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE T. WORTHEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SHURTLEFF AND
ANDREWS, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, Successor of THE
COMMISSION OF FINANCE,
Administrator of THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND,
Intervenor and Appellant.

Case No.

10651

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was commenced by Bruce Worthen
to recover damages from the defendant, Shurtleff
and Andrews, Inc., for injuries received in an industrial accident which occurred while Bruce
Worthen was working for H. E. Lowder Milk Company, while he was in the course and scope of his
employment. He received medical payments and
1

workmen's compensation from his employer's carrier, the State Insurance Fund.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial of the main action was before the Honorable A. H. Ellett sitting with a jury in Salt Lake
County, Utah. The action was settled during trial
for $60,000.00. After discussions with counsel the
Court directed that the amount of the settlement
be deposited with the Clerk of Court and payable
to Bruce Worthen, The State Insurance Fund and
Edward M. Garrett, attorney. An Order was then
entered allowing Bruce Worthen to withdraw all
funds deposited except the amount paid by the State
Insurance Fund for medical expense and workmen's
compensation. The Court then directed that the
Department of Finance appear and show cause why
it should not pay 25 5{:- of the retained amount as
attorney's fees. Before hearing on the matter the
facts of the workman's compensation and medical
pay were stipulated to by counsel and the Court
thereupon entered its Order providing in substance
that the Commission of Finance was obligated to
pay 25 % of the retained amount as attorney's fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Commission of Finance seeks a reversal of
the Court Order compelling it to pay attorney's
fees.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in the brief
of Intervenor and Appellant is correct.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMPENSATION CARRIER MUST PAY ITS
PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND ITS RECOVERY IS REDUCED BY
THAT AMOUNT.

The sole purpose of this Appeal is to re-examine
the reasoning in McConnell vs. The Commission of
Finance, 13 Utah 2nd 395, 375 Pac. 2nd 394, as
concerns the obligation of The State Insurance Fund
to pay attorney's fees on its share of the recovery
in a Third Party Tort action.
The statute involved is 35-1-62 UCA 1953 and
reads as follows:
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall have
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment,
the injured employee, or in case of death his
dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier
shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and
3

maintain the action either in its own name or
in the name of the injured employee, or his
heirs or the personal representative of the
deceased, provided the employer or canie 1·
may not settle and release the cause of action
without the consent of the commission.
If any recovery is obtained against such
third person it shall be disbursed as follows:
( 1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid
and charged proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear.
( 2) The person liable for compensation
payments shall be reimbursed in full for
all payments made.
( 3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in case of death,
to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any
obligation thereafter accruing against the
person liable for compensation.

In the case of McConnell vs. The Commission of
Finance, 13 - Utah 2nd 395, 375 Pac. 2nd 394, this
Court held under identical facts that the State Insurance Fund was not obligated to pay a proportionate share of the attorneys fees incurred in gaining a recovery in that action. 'The Court stated:
( 1) That the State Insurance Fund was
not a party to the action.
(2) That since the statute provides that the
insurance carrier must be reimbursed in full,
that the carrier would not be liable for its
proportionate share of costs and fees.
4

We think the Court has erred in its interpretation of this statute.
Seemingly, there exists an inconsistency or conflict in sub-sections 1 and 2 in the statute. Under
Sub-section 1 each party is charged a proportionate
share of the costs of the action. Under sub-section
2 provision is made that the insurance carrier must
be reimbursed for all payments made. Clearly, an
insurance carrier cannot pay its share of the costs
and be reimbursed in full at the same time. It
doesn't add up. Our purpose here is to show that
these sections can be reconciled and each given
effect. In so doing the reasoning in the McConnell
case, supra, must fall.
The first sub-section of the statute provides
that the expense including attorneys fees of the law
suit shall be paid and charged proportionately
against the parties as their interests may appear.
The statute in sub-section 1 by its language
obviously contemplates the fact that there are two
parties involved in this type of Third Party law
suit, namely, the injured employee and the insurance
carrier. The statute visualizes a situation wherein
an injured party has a Third Party case which is
worth more in damages than the total of the medical
expense and compensation paid by the insurance
carrie1· to date. This Court has recognized this in
its derision in Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum Compo11y, 3, Utah 2nd 203, 282 Pac. 2nd 304. The Court

in that case decided that the language of the statutr
gives the insurance carrier a right of action but
this is not a restriction on the injured employee
who also has a cause of action against the Third
Party.
The Court in the McConnell case, supra, seems
to indicate that only when the compensation carrier
is a party to the action does a situation arise where
sub-section 1 of the statute has any application. In
other words, if the injured employee files a law suit
and recovers from the Third Party there is no room
for the application of sub-section 1 because the compensation carrier must be reimbursed in full pursuant to sub-section 2. We do not believe that the
legislature intended that the word "Party" should
have such a narrow and restricted meaning. The
appropriate definition of the word '"Party" and
applicable to our statute is contained in the case
of Fong Sik Leung v. Diilles, 226 F.2d 74, (C.A.
Cal.) . The court defines the word party as follows:
"In its broadest meaning the word party includes one concerned with, conducting, or taking part in any matter or proceeding, whether
he is named or participates as formal party
or not."
The compensation carrier is an interested party
whether or not it is a party to the action and whether or not a law suit is even commenced. This situ·
ation, not contemplated by the McConnell case, is
where a claim is settled with the Third Party with6

out a law suit being filed by the injured employee
or the compensation carrier. Clearly, the compensation carrier is a party interested in the outcome of
these proceedings.
If a Third Party claim were settled before suit
then under the ruling of the McConnell case there
would be no parties to apportion the cost against
as set forth in sub-section 1 of the statute. There
may however be attorney's fees incurred in the process of securing the settlement. Clearly the Legislature did not intend that a void be created in this
area and it must be concluded that the word ''Party"
means those interested in the outcome of the settlement or the litigation.
If, however, the compensation carrier is not required to bear its proportionate share of the attorneys fees incurred, then in that situation subsection 1 of the statute would have no meaning and
would never be given effect. Clearly, the Legislature
had in mind the application of both sub-section 1
and sub-section 2. These two sections must be interpreted together and all of their terms given effect.. In order to do so the word "Party" in subsection 1 must be applied to both the insurance car1·ier and the injured employee.

The word "interest" in the first sub-section
must also be given effect.
7

Assume a situation where an employee has
received medical expense of $500.00 and compensation of $1,500.00 from the insurance carrier. He
employs counsel to represent him in an action and
agrees to pay the usual contingent fee of 1/3 of the
amount recovered. Assume that the recovery is
$2,400.00. This recovery is $400.00 greater than the
total of compensation and medical expense paid by
the carrier. To the extent of the $400.00 the injured employee has an "interest" in the recovery.
This is the interest that is mentioned in sub-section
1 of the statute. The attorney's fee of 1/3 must be
then applied against the recovery proportionately
as the interest of the parties appears. If the 1/3
contingent fee is first deducted from the recovery
of $2,400.00, then, of course, the interest of the injured workman is fully consumed and his interest
in the excess over compensation and medical payments is used solely to pay attorney's fees and he
receives nothing from his efforts in securing the
recovery. He would then have no interest even though
sub-section 1 specifically recognizes his interest in
the recovery.
Assume further that the recovery was for only
the payments made by the compensation carrier.
Since the carrier did not employ counsel then under
the ruling of the M cC011ncl1 case, supra, the carrier
would not be obligated to pay counsel because it
8

would be entitled to be paid in full. This is an injustice not intended by the legislature.
We recognize that sub-section 2 of the statute
1Jrovides that the insurance carrier must be reimbursed in full for all payments made. The intent
of the Legislature in this sub-section is simply to
provide that the injured employee will not receive
a double benefit and that the compensation carrier
will not be compelled to compromise its claim for
payments. This may be best shown by illustration:
Assume a case where substantial medical and compensation payments were made but where the liability of the Third Party was doubtful. The Third
Party might well be willing to pay the compensation and medical payments made plus some small
amount for general damage but unwilling to pay the
full value of the injuries. On the other hand the
injured employee may be willing to agree to such
a settlement providing that the insurance carrier
would compromise its claim for payments made. A
trial judge might likely be sympathetic to the claimant and attempt to apportion the various interests
of the injured employee and the compensation carrier based upon the facts that liability of the Third
Party was doubtful and that the case might well be
lost if tried. It would be a temptation under those
circumstances for a trial judge to compel the in9

surance carrier to take less than its full claim and
this is precisely what sub-section 2 of the statute
is designed to prevent.
This statute was not however designed to give
the compensation carrier a free ride which is the re,
sult under the McConnell. As the situation now e>.
ists the compensation carrier need not and cannot
be compelled to join in a Third Party suit, yet upon
recovery, it is entitled to receive every cent paid out
without bearing any of the burden of litigation.
0

In order to give full effect to both sub-sections
of the statute in all cases, it must be interpreted
to mean that whenever an insurance carrier pays
compensation and a Third Party claim results it
must participate proportionately in the costs and attorney's fees incurred.
Research into the various compensation laws of
other states shows that they vary both in wording
and intent from that of the Utah statute and hence
the case law on this subject provides little in the
way of precedent. There is one case, however, that
is directly in point and supports the position of the
Respondent here. In the case of Charles Seligman
Distributing Company vs. Brown, 360 So. West 2nd
509 (Ky. 1962) the injured workman sued a Third
Party and recovered damages. The Kentucky statute provides that the ernuloyee has to reimburse
the employer or his insurer for the amount paid out
10

as compensation. Reversing two prior cases of that
Court the Court stated and held:
" . . . Moreover, regardless of the respective
amounts recovered, where the employer or its
insurer has a reasonable opportunity to intervene in the employee's action against the
Third Party tortfeasor, but chooses not to
do so it would be inequitable to require the employee to bear the attorney fees on that portion of the recovery which K.R.S. 342.055
obliges him to pay over to the employer or its
insurer ... " Supra at 510.
In this case the State Insurance Fund was
aware of the institution of this action and made no
effort to intervene to recover its payments made.
Under the ruling of the McConnell case, supra, it
would never be necessary for the carrier to intervene because the injured employee is obligated to
reimburse the carrier in full. It is never responsible
for payment of fees where the injured employee
pulls the laboring oar. It is this injustice, not intended by the legislature, that must be corrected.
CONCLUSION
In a Third Party recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Statute it is provided: (1) That
there shall first be deducted the expense of the action including attorneys fees which shall be charged
against the parties as their interests may appear
and (2) That the compensation carrier shall be
i·eimbursed in full for all payments made. Under
11

the McConnell case only sub-section 2 of the statute is given effect. As a practical matter the insurance carrier achieves the benefits of successful
litigation or settlement but is under no obligation
to pay the expense.
The Legislature did not intend that the wol'd
"Party" as used in sub-section 1 should be restricted in its meaning to only those situations where the
insurance carrier is a party to the suit. This leaves
open that vast number of cases that are settled without litigation and where attorneys fees are incurred.
Nor did the legislature intend the "interest" of
the injured workman would be consumed in the payment of expense; and certainly it could not have
been intended that no expense would be incurred
by the carrier if the recovery did not exceed the
payments made.
The legislature intended that each party should
pay its share of costs. This should apply whether
the recovery is great or even where it does not exceed the payments made. The legislature further intended in Sub-section 2 that the carrier could not
be compelled to take less than its payments after
deducting its share of the expense.
This construction is the only one that accounts
for the "interest" of each "party" in all actions
12

whether settled or filed and whether the recovery
is great or small. Universal in application, it gives
full force and effect to all terms of the statute.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT

520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent

13

